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U.S.-EU TRADE BARRIERS AND THE TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
Lydia Ferrarese ∗
INTRODUCTION
In recent months, we have repeatedly heard divergent opinions on whether
U.S. trade agreements should be negotiated, renegotiated, or scrapped
altogether. The U.S.-EU trade of goods and services totals about $700 billion
annually, the largest amount of trade between any two partners anywhere in the
world. 1 Despite the magnitude of the trade and economic relationship between
the U.S. and the EU, many observers contend that the relationship has not
reached its full potential. 2 Recently, concerns about chronically low economic
growth and increased competition from emerging markets have intensified the
need for increased economic cooperation across the Atlantic. Low growth and
increased competition also prompted a protectionist reaction to increasingly
free trade as evidenced by the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European
Union and by the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States.
Today we may either seize the opportunity to create a long-term globalized
economy shaped by U.S. and European values or erect protectionist barriers to
maintain certain jobs in the short term.
The stated purpose of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) Agreement is to remove barriers to U.S.-EU trade across a wide range
of industries. 3

∗ Lydia Ferrarese, J.D., University of Bologna; L.L.M. Fordham University School of Law. Lydia is
currently a member at Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., where she represents domestic and foreign companies in
business litigation matters and corporate and commercial transactions. Ms. Ferrarese is admitted to practice
law in the State of New York and works in the English and Italian languages. Ms. Ferrarese has been cited in
New York Super Lawyers (2013–2014 Rising Star) for business litigation. She would like to thank John C.
Sullivan for his assistance on this article.
1 Op-Ed by President Barack Obama & Chancellor Angela Merkel, The Future of Transatlantic
Relations, Whitehouse.gov, (Nov.17,2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/17/op-edpresident-obama-and-chancellor-merkel-future-transatlantic.
2 Shayerah I. Akhtar & Vivian C. Jones, Cong. Research Serv., R43158, Proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (T-TIP): In Brief (2014), http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/ordbog/tord/ttip.pdf.
3 U.S. Mission to the EU, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Economic Issues, United
States Mission to the European Union, https://useu.usmission.gov/ttip-sme.html.
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Since tariffs between the U.S. and the EU are already low, around 4% on
average, 4 much of TTIP’s impact will stem from its emphasis on eliminating
non-tariff trade barriers. These non-tariff trade barriers primarily include:
harmonizing regulations pertaining to product safety and functionality, mutual
recognition of professional certifications, and improved processes for investorstate dispute resolution.
The purpose of this Article is to provide an update on the status of
negotiations since the U.S. presidential election, provide an overview of key
TTIP provisions, and ultimately to impress upon the incoming U.S.
administration the importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance of
which TTIP could be the centerpiece.
I. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS
The U.S. and the EU began TTIP negotiations in July 2013 and have held
15 rounds of negotiations so far. The fifteenth round concluded in New York
on October 7, 2016. 5
As of this writing, negotiations have been essentially put on hold until the
new U.S. administration is fully in place. 6 Given the campaign rhetoric of the
incoming administration, many commentators seriously doubt that TTIP
negotiations will be successfully concluded. 7 Even before the election, the goal
of successfully concluding TTIP negotiations seemed increasingly out of
reach. 8 Why? The most widely-held explanation is that “governments on both
sides of the Atlantic are under pressure from populist waves of discontent.” 9
But this is not the entire story. A significant factor complicating negotiations is
that they are occurring with 28 EU member states on one side, each with their
own separate national interests, and the 50 U.S. states on the other, with
4

Id.
European Commission, Report of the 15th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_155027.pdf.
6 Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting on 11/11/2016, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/11/11/.
7 V.S. Seshadri, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Discussion Paper No. 185,
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/DP%20185%20Amb
%20V%20S%20Sheshadri.pdf.
8 Josh Lederman & Kathleen Hennessey, Obama Loses Reliable Partner, Faces Uncertainty after
Brexit, PBS Newshour, (Jun. 25, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/obama-losesreliable-partner-faces-uncertainty-after-brexit/.
9 Judy Dempsey, Judy Asks: Will TTIP Happen?, Carnegie Europe, Apr. 27, 2016, http://
carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/63458.
5
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different sets of laws and regulations in each. This political reality was on full
display in the recent EU vote to approve the Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA), a trade deal like TTIP but between the EU and
Canada. To be fully-implemented, CETA must be ratified by 38 regional and
national EU parliaments. 10 On October 14, 2016, the parliament for the
Belgian region of Wallonia voted to block CETA, effectively derailing the
entire agreement. Witnessing this debacle play out, observers have noted that
with so many potential vetoes held by regional governments, it is difficult to
see how TTIP, a much bigger deal with the United States, could possibly be
passed. 11
Despite these difficulties, successfully concluding a substantive TTIP
agreement would benefit both the U.S. and the EU resulting in more consumer
choice and increased competitiveness for both large and small businesses.
Along with the economic benefits of increased cooperation, a broad and
substantive TTIP could also strategically complement the increasingly tenuous
military alliance among NATO member states. To better understand how TTIP
can deliver on its promise, we next analyze several key provisions that are still
being negotiated.
II. KEY PROVISIONS
A. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
One of the most debated provisions of the TTIP is the investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) provision. 12 An ISDS provision would allow European
businesses investing in the U.S. (and vice versa) to bring claims against the
U.S. government through arbitral tribunals alleging that investment protection
obligations have been breached. For example, international investment
agreements typically provide that a government can only expropriate (i.e.,
nationalize) an investment if it pays sufficient compensation to the investor. If
a country expropriates such an investment without providing sufficient
compensation, the investor could use ISDS to bring a claim directly against

10 Hot-Air Walloons, The Economist, Oct. 22, 2016., at p. 46 available at http://www.economist.com/
news/europe/21709060-tiny-region-belgium-opposes-trade-reasons-are-hard-understand-wallonia.
11 Id.
12 European Commission, Fact Sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlements in
EU Agreements, (November 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf.
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that country, claiming a breach of investment protection obligations and
seeking damages. 13
Supporters of ISDS use examples like this as proof that an improved
investor-state dispute settlement process will “ensure that Americans doing
business abroad receive the same kinds of protections—such as protection
from discrimination and expropriation without compensation—that are
available to companies and investors doing business in the United States under
U.S. law.” 14 Detractors of ISDS argue that such provisions favor corporate
investors and interfere with the democratic process by restricting states’ rights
to legislate in the public interest. These detractors also criticize ISDS’s lack of
transparency. Faced with this criticism, both sides have propounded shared
principles that seek to ameliorate the ISDS while retaining its core function—
encouraging international investment by providing greater protections for
investors. These principles include: (1) open hearings, (2) protecting the
national right to regulate, (3) awarding attorney’s fees for frivolous claims, and
(4) limiting remedies against governments to monetary damages only. 15 These
principles, if effectively implemented, might just be the compromise the two
sides have been looking for to overcome the impasse on this issue.
B. Regulatory Cooperation
Though ISDS is the most hotly debated provision, the provisions
concerning regulatory cooperation have been regarded by many participants in
the negotiations as TTIP’s core. 16 The concept of “regulatory cooperation” is
defined as “the process of interaction between U.S. and EU regulators, founded
on the benefits regulators can achieve through closer partnership and greater
regulatory interoperability.” 17 Regulatory cooperation can occur in two
13

U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Office of the United
States Trade Representative https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/
investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds.
14 U.S. Trade Representative, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Upgrading & Improving Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-and-Improving-Investor-State-DisputeSettlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
15 Id.
16 U.S. Trade Representative, Transcript from the Closing Press Conference of the Fifth Round of
Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership Negotiations, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
May 23, 2014, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2014/May/Transcriptfrom-Closing-Press-Conference-Fifth-Round-TTIP-Negotiations.
17 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Regulatory Coherence & Cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/regulatory_coherence_
regulatory_cooperation_chamber_ttip_paper-final_2.pdf.
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primary ways: by creating joint standards, or by mutually recognizing existing
standards. The EU prefers the former method 18 while the U.S. seems to prefer
the latter. 19
Each method has its upsides and its downsides. On one hand, the EU’s
preferred method of creating joint standards is difficult to accomplish. In the
realm of international trade, as in most of international relations, each side is
reluctant to relinquish its sovereign authority to regulate commerce to another
nation. On the other hand, mutually recognizing existing standards has the
downside of not creating a single world standard to which third-party countries
(e.g., China) can adhere. Thus, instead of promoting economic efficiency,
mutual recognition of existing standards has the potential to divert trade from
lower-cost producers who cannot adhere to the new standards to higher-cost
producers favored under the new regulations. The negative impact of trade
diversion is two-fold. First, diverted trade may hurt the non-member nation
economically and politically, this has the potential to create a dangerouslystrained relationship between the non-member nation and the member-nations.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the shift from one nation with a high
comparative advantage in a product or service to a nation with a lower
comparative advantage for the same product or service is inefficient on its face
and works to decrease the overall surplus. A decrease in the overall surplus
harms consumers as it burdens them with increased prices and decreased
quality.
Given the political difficulty of establishing joint standards, mutual
recognition agreements are likely more appropriate to improve regulatory
compatibility in the short term. Attention must be paid towards avoiding the
negative consequences of trade diversion.
Thus, negotiations between the EU and the U.S. should focus on preparing
a process through which other countries, namely, China, India, and Japan,
could sign association agreements with the TTIP signatories. Such agreements
would allow a third country’s product that conforms to either a U.S. or EU

18 European Commission, Technical Barriers to Trade: Initial EU Position Paper, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151627.pdf [“The EU is therefore a major supporter of the international
standard-setting system.”].
19 U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership: A Detailed View, Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 2014,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-Inthe-TTIP-a-Detailed-View.
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standard to be automatically declared as conforming to both standards without
need of further assessment.
C. Technical Barriers to Trade
Less than critical regulatory cooperation, but still an important part of
TTIP, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) are defined as a “mandatory
technical regulations and voluntary standards that define specific
characteristics that a product should have, such as its size, shape, design,
labelling/marketing/packaging, functionality, or performance.” 20 TBTs are not
an inherently bad thing. In fact, the primary reason that the number of technical
regulations has multiplied in recent years is a direct function of higher living
standards worldwide, which have boosted consumers’ demand for safe and
high-quality products. 21
Sometimes TBTs can be arbitrary and discriminatory. For example,
consider a hypothetical in which a state decides to prohibit the importation of
any bicycle with tires greater than 25 inches. Such a decision has no grounding
in public policy but has the potential to harm manufacturers of slightly-largerthan-average bicycles. This is the sort of TBT that TTIP hopes to eliminate. In
the most recent round of negotiations, the parties continued to discuss draft
provisions of their respective proposals on: transparency, the resolution of
trade concerns, cooperation and institutional provisions, namely the TBT
Committee to be created under TTIP, standards and conformity assessment.
D. Tariffs
Average U.S. and EU tariffs are already low. However, given the
magnitude of the transatlantic relationship further elimination and reduction of
tariffs could yield significant economic gains. Most observers generally view
tariffs as “low-hanging fruit” in these ongoing negotiations.
Both the EU and the U.S. are calling for the elimination of most tariffs
immediately and “phasing out all but the most sensitive tariffs in a short time
frame,” which means that some products could be accorded longer phase-outs,
partial liberalization, or even exemptions from tariff reforms. 22
20

European Commission, Technical Barriers to Trade, infra note 21.
European Commission, Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade, https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm#problem.
22 European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, May 18, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016-002218&language=EN.
21
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E. Regulating the Financial Sector
There is an ongoing debate about whether the scope of TTIP negotiations
should include financial services. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic
have undertaken reforms of their respective financial systems following the
global financial crises of 2008–2009. These reforms have raised questions
about the coherence of international financial regulation and whether
differences in regulations affect the competitiveness of domestic financial
services firms. For its part, the Obama Administration has expressed reluctance
to include financial services regulation in TTIP, in part, because of concern
that it may undermine its ability to regulate domestic financial markets on its
own. 23
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD IN A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY
TTIP has the potential to create significant changes in international trade
and economic relations. For the U.S., TTIP is a continuation of its support for
comprehensive regional free trade agreements and demonstrates that the U.S.
has no intention of ignoring Europe in the era marked by the increasing rise of
the developing world. For the EU, TTIP is an important reaffirmation of
transatlantic ties at a time when many EU member states are struggling with
high unemployment and stagnant growth.
TTIP is too important of an opportunity for the U.S. and EU to pass up.
Should negotiations stall or produce results not seen as sufficiently ambitious,
further questions could be raised about the strength of the transatlantic
relationship. Perhaps even more concerning, if the U.S. and the EU do not take
the lead and shape the rules for global trade going forward, that void may be
filled by others—others who may not share the European and American
standards for protection of human rights and the natural environment.

23 Inu Barbee & Simon Lester, Financial Services in the TTIP: Making the Prudential Exception Work,
GEO. J. INT’L L., 953–54 (2014), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/
recent/upload/zsx00414000953.PDF.

